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This paper examines the main determinants of individual attitudes towards immigration in
Europe. Our results suggest that both economic and non-economic variables shape attitudes
towards immigration, but the relative importance of these factors depends crucially on the
race/ethnicity of the arriving immigrants. While fears over labour market competition are
more likely to shape attitudes towards the arrival of same race immigrants, more exposure to
immigrants reduces opposition towards the arrival of different race immigrants. These
findings persist after controlling for socioeconomic characteristics, and after exploiting the
data to allow for cohort-specific effects.
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21. Introduction
Immigration is often a hotly debated topic and one that is likely to loom large in political and
media circles throughout Europe as worsening economic conditions take hold. Tensions between
natives and immigrants are often portrayed, in the media at least, as being at their worse in an
economic downturn as immigrants and natives compete for scarce jobs and public resources.
With this in mind, this paper investigates the extent to which economic and non-economic factors
shape attitudes towards immigration in Europe, and in doing so focuses on an issue that has
received much less attention in the literature, namely the extent to which attitudes towards
immigration vary with the race or ethnicity of the arriving immigrants.
A large literature has developed examining attitudes towards immigration, across a wide
range of countries.1 Much of the empirical research in this area focuses on the economic effects
of immigration and finds that attitudes towards the arrival of immigrants are strongly shaped by
economic self-interest. Native workers appear to be more likely to oppose immigration when they
feel threatened by labour market competition from migrants. Scheve and Slaughter (2001), for
example, find that less-skilled individuals are more likely to oppose the arrival of immigrants
(and vice versa), and argue that attitudes towards immigration are influenced by a person’s
position in the labour market. Similarly, Mayda (2006) finds that skilled individuals are more
likely to favour immigration in countries where the relative skill composition of natives relative
to immigrants is high (and vice versa). Such findings are consistent with the labour market
predictions of the factor proportions model.2
In contrast, Hainmueller and Hiscox (2007), using European data, argue that the relationship
between education (which is often used as a proxy for skill level) and attitudes towards
immigrants has little to do with fears about labour market competition. They find that individuals
with higher levels of education are more likely to favour immigration regardless of the
immigrant’s skill level or country of origin. Similarly, Citrin et al. (1997) find little role for
personal economic circumstances in shaping attitudes towards immigrants, while Dustmann and
Preston (2007) assert that racial prejudice is an important factor.
1 See, for example, Hainmuller and Hiscox (2010), Facchini, et al. (2007), Kessler (2001), Scheve and Slaughter
(2001), Citrin et al. (1997), and Espenshade and Hempstead (1996) for the US; Dustman and Preston (2001 and
2007) for the UK; Hainmuller and Hiscox (2007) for Europe; and Facchini and Mayda (2008) and Mayda (2006) for
the US, Canada, Japan and a sample of countries in Europe.
2 In other words, assuming that skilled and unskilled workers are complements, if natives are more skilled than
immigrants, immigration should reduce the supply of skilled workers relative to unskilled workers and raise the
skilled wage, whereas the opposite is true in countries with a low skill composition of natives relative to immigrants.
3Welfare considerations are also important in shaping attitudes towards immigration. Hanson
et al. (2007) using data for the US find that exposure to fiscal pressure from migrants’ increases
opposition towards immigration, especially among the more skilled. In a cross-country analysis,
Facchini and Mayda (2009) show that individuals on a high income are more likely to oppose
immigration in countries where immigrants are unskilled and therefore potentially represent a net
burden to the welfare state (and vice versa when immigrants are skilled). Dustmann and Preston
(2007) also find that welfare concerns play a major role in determining attitudes towards
immigration.
With a few exceptions, the literature tends to assume that natives view all immigrants in the
same way.3 Attitudes towards immigration are however likely to vary with the race or ethnicity of
the arriving immigrants, especially if the arriving immigrants are of a different race or ethnicity
to the dominant race/ethnic group within a country. Thus grouping all immigrants together and
pooling across countries is likely to produce unreliable results. This is likely to be particularly
true in Europe where the composition of the immigrant population varies widely across countries.
We attempt to address these limitations by conducting an analysis of attitudes towards
immigration using data from the European Social Survey (ESS), a particularly rich data set for
examining some of the issues surrounding immigration. Above all, the ESS enables us to
investigate the extent to which attitudes are affected by the race or ethnicity of the arriving
immigrants. In addition, although the ESS is not a panel and hence the same individuals cannot
be tracked over time we are, nevertheless, able to use the data to construct a pseudo panel (see
Deaton, 1985) and track different ‘cohorts’ over time in order to eliminate any unobserved fixed
effects.
A common way to gauge the impact foreign workers have on the domestic labour market is to
control for the relative income and education level (as a proxy for skill) of the native population.
We refine this approach and match in data from the European Union Labour Force Survey (EU
LFS) to examine the effect the size of the immigrant population has on attitudes towards
immigration. Indubitably there are two effects at work in this context. Firstly, attitudes are likely
3 Dustmann and Preston (2007) use data from the British Social Attitudes Survey and distinguish among immigrants
from four origin regions: the West Indies, India and Pakistan, countries in the European common market, and
Australia and New Zealand. Hainmueller and Hiscox (2007) use data from a single wave of the European Social
Survey to investigate whether attitudes towards immigration depend on the origin of immigrants (from richer or
poorer countries both in and outside Europe), while Hainmueller and Hiscox (2010) use data from a survey
experiment to investigate the role played by the immigrants’ skill level.
4to be shaped by exposure to immigrants in daily life.4 Secondly, natives may be more likely to
oppose immigration when they feel threatened by labour market competition from migrants, since
it is likely to induce downward pressure on labour market opportunities and wages. We attempt
to separate these conflicting effects by controlling for both the proportion of non-nationals in the
respondent’s region and the proportion of non-nationals in each occupation. We argue that the
former proxies for the degree of contact respondents have with immigrants, while the latter
captures the competition effect.
We find that contact is important in shaping attitudes towards immigration, but mainly
towards those of a different race or ethnic group to the dominant group within a country. In
general, more exposure to immigrants appears to reduce opposition towards the arrival of
different race/ethnicity immigrants, but perhaps not surprisingly has little effect on attitudes
towards the arrival of those of the same race or ethnicity. In contrast, we find evidence of a
positive association between our proxy for labour market competition and a restrictive
immigration policy (Mayda, 2006, finds a similar result). However, once again race/ethnicity has
an important role to play. Natives appear to regard immigrants of the same race or ethnicity as
representing a greater ‘threat’ to their labour market opportunities than those of a different race or
ethnicity. This result is also correlated with education levels, and we find that highly educated
Europeans (those with a post-secondary education) appear to only perceive labour market
competition from immigrants of the same race or ethnicity.
Finally, we show that public finance considerations are also important in shaping attitudes
towards immigration, but mainly towards those of a different race/ethnicity. Immigrants of a
different race/ethnicity to the native population appear to be perceived as being more likely to
make use of public funds than immigrants of the same race/ethnicity. Dustmann and Preston
(2007) make a similar finding in their study of the UK.
Taking these results together the following tentative ‘story’ emerges. An individual’s attitude
towards immigration is a complex interplay of factors. It is not just shaped by economic self-
interest, but also by non-economic factors, such as a fear of the unknown, cultural considerations,
and welfare concerns. However, perhaps more than most, this study highlights that the relative
importance of any factor, be it economic or non-economic, in shaping attitudes towards
immigration depends crucially on the race/ethnicity of the arriving immigrants and hence on the
size and nature of the immigrant population. Such a finding persists after controlling for
4 More exposure may either increase or decrease the perceived threat posed by immigrants (Card et al., 2005).
5socioeconomic characteristics and exploiting the data to allow for cohort-specific effects.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 illustrates our data and presents
some summary statistics. In Section 3, we present our methodology. Section 4 outlines our main
empirical results, while in Section 5 we conclude.
2. Data
This paper uses data from a number of sources: data on attitudes towards immigration is
drawn from the European Social Survey (ESS), while information on country performance is
obtained from Eurostat. The ESS is a biennial survey carried out in over 30 countries in Europe.
The aim of this survey is to examine attitudes, beliefs and values across countries in Europe and
some of its close neighbours, and how they change over time and across countries. We use three
rounds of the ESS5: 2001/2002, 2003/2004 and 2005/2006 and focus on the countries for which
we have at least two years worth of data, which includes: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland.6
Only individuals who are citizens of the country in which they are interviewed are sampled.
Table 1a in the Appendix provides the structure of the repeated cross-sections.
The ESS is a particularly rich data set for examining some of the issues surrounding
immigration and we use the answers to the following two questions to construct our measures of
the respondent’s attitude towards immigration: 1. ‘To what extent do you think [country] should
allow people of the same race or ethnic group as most [country] people to come and live here?’,
and 2. ‘How about people of a different race or ethnic group from most [country] people?’ The
survey allows for four ordered responses to both questions: ‘allow many to come and live here’,
‘allow some’, ‘allow a few’, and ‘allow none’.
In line with the existing literature (see for example, Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007 and
Facchini and Mayda, 2009) we classify those respondents who report that they want to ‘allow
none’ or ‘allow a few’ as those who want to limit the arrival of further immigrants (0 otherwise).
We use this variable to gauge attitudes towards further immigration regardless of the race or
ethnicity of the arriving immigrants. We are also interested in the effect race or ethnic origin has
5 The first round of the ESS had a specific extra module on migration and minority related issues not present in the
other rounds. However, all rounds provide the overall attitudinal response of individuals to further immigration, and
also direct responses to an array of questions concerning the perceived effect immigrants have on the economy.
6on attitudes towards further immigration. We therefore classify respondents who want to ‘allow
none’ or ‘allow a few’ immigrants of the same race or ethnic group as those who want to limit the
arrival of same race/ethnicity immigrants (0 otherwise), and those who want to ‘allow none’ or
‘allow a few’ immigrants of a different race or ethnic group as those who want to limit the arrival
of different race/ethnicity immigrants (0 otherwise). We also analyse whether our main results
are robust to alternative definitions of our dependent variables. For ease of notation we refer to
immigrants as simply same race or different race.
The ESS also collects a host of information on the respondent’s socioeconomic background
which is potentially important in explaining attitudes towards further immigration. This includes
information on social and political views, religious identity, household characteristics (including
age, household size, level of education, parents’ country of birth), area of residence (city versus
rural) and income (our proxy for economic status).
We also match in data from the EU LFS7 to examine the effect the size of the immigrant
population has on opposition to immigration. As already mentioned, there are likely to be two
conflicting effects at work in this context: the size of the immigrant population may be acting as a
proxy for both the level of contact that individuals face from migrants and the degree of labour
market competition. We attempt to separate these conflicting effects by matching in data on the
proportion of non-nationals in the respondent’s region at NUTS level 2 (subdivisions of a
country) and, for each country, the proportion of non-national workers in the respondent’s
occupation at the one-digit level (ten occupations). Both indicators are measured for each round
of data. We argue that the former captures the contact effect, while the latter proxies for the effect
of labour market competition level (Mayda, 2006 attempts to measure the effects of labour
market competition in a similar manner).8
Since the regions defined at NUTS level 2 are rather big and often geographically diverse
entities within a country, we also include data from Eurostat on the regional unemployment rate
(again at NUTS level 2) and in all empirical models we cluster on region to control for other
sources of heterogeneity.9 Finally, we match in information on country performance using data
7 The EU LFS is a quarterly household survey carried out in all EU member states, candidate countries and EFTA
countries (except Liechtenstein).
8 Perfect separation of ‘contact’ and ‘competition’ effects is practically impossible, as natives both get to know non-
nationals who work in the same occupation and also compete with them for jobs (and other resources) in the same
region.
9 We focus on the explanation of attitudes at the individual level while controlling for economic and non-economic
regional characteristics. Markaki and Longhi (2012) follow a rather different approach and analyse the impact of
regional characteristics on shaping attitudes towards immigration.
7from Eurostat. This includes expenditure on social protection as a percentage of GDP and total
crimes recorded by the police as a proportion of the population. A full definition of the variables
used in this paper is presented in Table 2a in the Appendix.
2.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 outlines some simple descriptive statistics of the main variables. We report mean
responses and depending on the nature of the question either standard deviations or, for the
categorical variables, the number reporting the highlighted response.
<< Table 1 here >>
The sample composition of the ESS is relatively constant over the three waves of the survey
and is evenly split between males and females. The average respondent is in his/her mid-40s, and
lives in the city in a household with at least one other member (the average household size is 2.6).
The majority of respondents (around 60%) have an education level of upper secondary or above,
are in paid employment, and have an annual income of between €12,000 and €36,000.
Turning to our measures of attitudes towards immigration we find that although 47% (in
2002) of respondents want to limit the arrival of immigrants, they appear more likely to want to
limit the arrival of immigrants of a different race than those of the same race: 45% (in 2002) want
to limit the arrival of immigrants of a different race compared with only 32% for those of the
same race.
Disaggregating some of these responses by country (Table 2) we find that there is substantial
cross-country variation in attitudes towards immigration. Respondents in Greece want to limit the
arrival of immigrants the most. At the other end of the spectrum, respondents in Sweden,
Switzerland and Ireland appear to be more pro-immigration.
<< Table 2 here >>
A common finding across all countries, even our pro-immigration countries, is that
respondents are more likely to oppose the arrival of immigrants of a different race compared to
those of the same race. However, differences emerge in the extent to which countries prefer
immigrants of the same race compared with those of a different race. The Nordic countries (here
Finland, Norway and Denmark) appear more prejudiced towards the arrival of different race
immigrants while the UK appears to be tolerant towards immigrants regardless of their race or
ethnicity. Such findings may be reflective of the immigration histories of these countries. The
leading foreign group within each country often reflects historical links, relationships with former
8colonies and ease of access (in terms of geography or immigration policy). The UK, for example,
has a long history of immigration as a result of its colonial past, most notably from the Indian
subcontinent and the Caribbean (Hansen, 2003). In contrast, given its geographical position and
close connection to Russia a high percentage of immigrants to Finland are from neighbouring
Russia, while immigrants to Denmark come from its close neighbours Poland, Germany and
Norway (Herm, 2008).
Next we investigate how attitudes towards immigration are affected by the proportion of non-
nationals in the respondent’s region (columns 10, 11 and 12). Overall we find evidence of a
negative correlation between the proportion of non-nationals in the respondent’s region and
opposition towards immigration. This provides some initial evidence that contact plays a role in
explaining attitudes towards immigration. In addition, this negative correlation is greater for
opposition towards different race than same race immigrants, providing further support for the
notion that the proportion of non-nationals in the respondent’s region proxies for the degree of
exposure natives have with immigrants. We argue that individuals fear what they do not know, or
are unfamiliar with, so it follows that the more exposure natives have to immigrants in daily life,
particularly those of a different race or ethnicity, the lower should be their opposition to further
immigration.
Of course natives who have a negative view of immigration may avoid or have already left
regions where the share of migrants is high. Schelling develops a dynamic model of segregation
(1971, 1978) where each agent belongs to one of two groups. He shows that under certain
assumptions the equilibrium condition is complete segregation, even if nearly everyone would
‘prefer mixed neighbourhoods’. Schelling argues that if the proportion of group 2 residences
exceeds some ‘tolerance’ limit or tipping point, this will cause the group 1 residents to move out
of the neighbourhood to an alternative location. There is, however, little empirical evidence that
immigration leads to the displacement of natives in either US data (Card and DiNardo, 2000;
Card, 2001) or in European data (Gonzalez and Ortega, 2009), and we would argue that concerns
about labour market opportunities, together with family history dominate the decision about
where to live.
However, an alternative explanation for these findings is that immigrants may prefer to
migrate to countries or regions that are less opposed to immigration. The popularity of some of
our countries (e.g., the UK) as a destination for different race immigrants might be partially due
to liberal attitudes of the native population towards immigration, or liberal immigration policies
9that are determined by these attitudes. This explanation holds for some of our countries where the
correlation between the proportion of non-nationals in the respondent’s region and opposition
towards immigration is negative. However, within certain countries this correlation coefficient is
positive (especially in relation to those of a different race), and for these countries it is doubtful
that immigrants would choose to migrate to countries where opposition to immigrants is high. On
a related issue, Dustman and Preston (2001) argue that ethnic minorities are unlikely to choose to
live in areas where there is a high degree of racial intolerance. The countries where the
correlation coefficient is positive tend to be those where large-scale immigration is a recent




We begin our multivariate analysis by estimating the probability that individual i wants to
limit the arrival of further immigrants ( ity = 1) using a latent variable model of the form:
* '
1it it i ity X u    t=1,…,T and i =1,…,Nt (1)
where *ity is the latent propensity that individual i favours a restrictive immigration policy, itX
are the set of regressors thought to affect immigration including the country specific effects, i
represents the unobserved individual specific effect, and itu is a random error that is distributed
standard normally. Since different individuals are observed in each period this implies that i runs
from 1 to Nt for time period t. All specifications have robust standard errors clustered on region to
address heteroskedasticity and to allow for any correlation across individuals within the same
region.
Our models include controls for economic variables (labour market competition, employment
status, and income), non-economic variables (the degree of contact with immigrants, political
ideology, and religion), and objective measures (the regional unemployment rate, expenditure on
social security protection as a percentage of GDP, and the crime rate).
The ESS is not a panel and hence individuals are not ‘tracked’ over time. We thus initially
assume that the individual fixed effects are uncorrelated with the observed regressors and pool
our observations across the three waves of data.
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3.2 Pseudo Panel
Even though we cannot observe the same individual over time, we can, however, use the data
to construct a pseudo panel (Deaton, 1985) and follow different cohorts over time in order to
estimate relationships based on cohort means. This relaxes the assumption that the individual
fixed effects are uncorrelated with some or all of the explanatory variables.10 This methodology
has been widely used in applied research (Attanasio, 1993, for example, examines household
savings in the US; Deaton, 1997, looks at consumption patterns in Taiwan; and Pencavel, 1998,
analyses labour markets in the US).
Following Deaton (1985) we define a set of C cohorts such that in any time t individual i only
belong to one of these cohorts. The observed cohort means then satisfy the relationship:
ctctctct uXy  2 c=1,…,C (2)
where cty is the average of ity for all members of cohort c at time t and ct are the cohort fixed
effects. Since we are not tracking the same individuals over time, ct is not constant over time t.
Despite this, Deaton (1985) argues that if the cohort size is sufficiently large then ct is a good
approximation for the cohort population c . We thus estimate equation (2) by replacing ct with a
set of dummy variables, one for each cohort.
Finally, Deaton (1985) also asserts that there is potentially a measurement error problem
arising from using cty as an estimate of the unobservable population cohort mean and argues that
equation (2) should be estimated using an errors in variable technique. However, as the cohort
size increases, measurement error becomes less of a problem and this approach is typically
ignored if the number of observations per cohort (nc) is sufficiently ‘large’ (see, for example,
Browning et al., 1985 and Blundell et al., 1993).11 There is, however, no general rule to judge
whether the number of observations per cohort is large enough to use asymptotics based on nc.
Verbeek (2008) argues that the asymptotic behaviour of pseudo panel estimators can be derived
using an alternative type of asymptotics based on having a large number of cohorts of more or
less constant size. In binary choice models, Collado (1998) shows that estimates need to rely on
10 In a standard pooled probit model estimates are biased if the omitted/ unobserved variables are correlated with any
of the regressors. Attitudes towards immigrants are, however, likely to be closely related to unobserved factors
related to the native’s upbringing, which is likely to be correlated with observable characteristics such as income and
education.
11 Verbeek and Nijman (1992) suggest that in a cohort comprising of 100 individuals where the time variation in the
cohort means is sufficiently large, the bias in the standard fixed effects estimator will be small enough that the
measurement error problem can be ignored.
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asymptotics based on a large number of cohorts. She further demonstrates that by doing so it is
possible to obtain a consistent within-groups estimator for binary choice models.
Since we are interested in estimating a binary choice model, the important dimension of our
pseudo panel is the large number of cohorts. We define the cohorts based on ten-year interval age
groups, one-digit NACE economic sectors, and one-digit ISCO88 occupation groups.12 The ten-
year age intervals allow for unobserved differences in the quality of education, skills and
attitudes, and for homogeneity within groups and heterogeneity between groups. The first age
group includes individuals born before 1937. These respondents are at least 65 years old in the
first round of the ESS and are likely to be retired throughout the sample period. The second age
group comprises of individuals born in the period 1938-1947, and so on until the sixth age group
which is made up of respondents born after 1977. Individuals in each of the six age groups are
then divided according to their occupation and the economic sector in which they have their main
activity.13
Variables on which cohorts are defined should be time-invariant and observed for all
individuals in the sample. They should be appropriately correlated with the variables used in the
model but uncorrelated with the unobservables (Verbeek, 2008). One could argue that, in our
context, an individual’s economic sector and occupation is subject to choice, and thus potentially
endogenous. For instance, individuals who dislike immigrants may leave an occupation if the
share of migrants becomes large. Despite this, we feel that the endogeneity of these variables is
potentially low in our case. Individuals acquire specific labour market skills and as such changing
occupation or economic sector would involve large retraining costs. Moreover, both economic
sector and occupation are used at a high aggregation level.
We can construct a maximum theoretical number of 864 cohorts from our data: 6 (age groups)
x 16 (economic sectors) x 9 (occupations) = 864 cohorts for each ESS round.14 As we do not
observe individuals from each birth cohort in each occupation and economic sector in all three
rounds, we have an unbalanced panel of 2,035 observations for a total of 710 cohorts. The
average cohort is based on 80 individuals, which is large enough to reduce the potential
measurement error discussed above. We estimate equation (2) by weighted least squares as is
12 This classification refers to the individuals’ last job for those not currently working and their parents’ job for
young people still in full-time education. Our results hold if we drop the small proportion of young people in full-
time education.
13 Variables used in the literature to define cohorts include: age (Deaton, 1985); age and education (Blundell et al.,
1998); age and region (Propper et al., 2001).
14 Individuals employed in extraterritorial organizations or whose occupations are in armed forces are excluded.
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standard in the literature (see, for example, Propper et al., 2001) since the average cohort size
disguises large variation within cohorts. We also employ a fixed-effects estimator to eliminate
any unobserved fixed cohort specific factors (age-sector-occupation effects). By construction, the
pseudo panel controls for fixed economic sector, occupation, and age group differences. These
variables are therefore excluded from the regression and we control for differences within cohorts
only.
As an alternative specification, we could define the cohorts using country of residence, since
as we have already shown attitudes towards immigration vary across countries. This would
however cause the fixed effects to capture both the country specific factors together with the
specific effects of the other variables used to define the cohorts. Since we want to include other
country specific variables in our regressions, in this instance, we prefer to control for country
specific effects explicitly through the presence of country dummies.
4. Empirical Results
Table 3 illustrates our results for a standard probit pooled over all observations and also for
the fixed effects estimator. Results are reported for opposition towards the arrival of all
immigrants, same race immigrants and different race immigrants, respectively. The explanatory
variables are split into economic, non-economic (social and political), and household
characteristics. We also include country and times dummies in all specifications.15 For each
probit regression, the table provides details of marginal effects (evaluated at the means of the
regressor variables) and levels of significance. The results that follow are robust to pooling over
all observations and controlling for unobserved effects in a pseudo panel.
<< Table 3 here >>
Of most interest in this context is the relationship between opposition towards immigration
and the size of the immigrant population. We find evidence of a negative association between the
proportion of non-nationals in the respondent’s region and opposition towards the arrival of
different race immigrants, which is in line with the summary statistics outlined in the previous
section. We argue that one explanation for this finding is that individuals fear what they do not
know, or are unfamiliar with, so it follows that more exposure to immigrants in daily life,
especially those of a different race or ethnicity to the native population should decrease
15 As in the pseudo panel each variable ctx is constructed as the average of xit for all members of cohort c at time t the
country dummies are the percentage of individuals from a given country.
13
opposition. In addition, we find that other variables which may also proxy for the degree of
exposure native workers have with immigrants/ethnic minorities is also significant in this setting.
We find that living in a city (pooled probit results) has a negative effect on opposition towards
immigration, as does being born abroad or having at least one parent who was born abroad. On a
related issue, Dustmann et al. (2011) show that in areas of higher local ethnic concentration,
harassment towards minority groups is lower, even though overall hostility on the part of the
population is not.
We also find evidence of a positive association between labour market competition and
opposition towards immigration, which is more pronounced towards those of the same race than
towards those of a different race. Natives thus appear to regard same race immigrants as
representing a greater threat to their jobs than those of a different race. Such a finding is in line
with expectations. Same race immigrants are likely to be similar to the native population in terms
of educational background, skill, and experience. We investigate this finding further in the next
sub-section when we disaggregate our results by educational attainment.
Turning to our other variables we find, in line with Facchini and Mayda (2009), that being on
a higher income reduces opposition towards further immigration, although this effect is greater
towards those of a different race than towards those of the same race. Non-economic factors also
appear to be important in this setting and we find evidence of a negative relationship between
those who report being religious (pooled probit) and opposition towards immigrants, while there
is a positive association between individuals with a right-wing political ideology or who feel
unsafe in the local area after dark (pooled probit) and wanting to limit the arrival of further
immigrants, especially those of a different race.
Opposition towards the arrival of immigrants also arises on cultural grounds, and we find
evidence of a positive relationship between individuals who feel that immigration is bad for a
country’s culture and those who want to limit the arrival of immigrants (Mayda, 2006, finds a
similar result), especially those of a different race. Dustmann and Preston (2007) argue that
prejudice of this kind may arise out of a fear for losing national characteristics or a taste for
cultural homogeneity. Finally, we find a positive association between those natives who feel that
immigrants are bad for the country and opposition towards immigration.16
16 Although the attitudinal variables Immigrants are bad for the economy/culture/country are potentially endogenous
in this setting since they may measure similar outcomes to the dependent variables, the correlation coefficients
between these variables and our three dependent variables are relatively small (ranging from 0.29 to 0.51). In Section
4.3 we analyse the extent to which our main results are robust to the exclusion of these three variables.
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Next we investigate whether the belief that immigrants are bad for the country is linked to
more ‘objective’ measures such as expenditure on social protection as a proportion of GDP
(SSGDP) and the crime rate (Table 4).
<< Table 4 here >>
We interact Immigrants are bad for the country with SSGDP and find evidence of a positive
association between this variable and opposition towards different race immigrants (columns 4
and 10). Such a finding also holds if we interact Immigrants are bad for the country with the
crime rate (columns 5 and 11). In other words, natives appear to believe that different race
immigrants make the country a worse place to live, at least partly, through their impact on social
security benefit and the crime rate. Respondents from countries with a higher ratio of social
security expenditure to total GDP may, for example, fear that different race immigrants will
benefit, at their expense, from their country’s welfare state. There is evidence that immigrants
are, on average, more likely than natives to be in receipt of welfare benefits (see Boeri, et al.,
2002 for the EU and Hanson, et al., 2005 for the US). In contrast, for the UK, Dustmann et al.
(2010) find that immigrants from Central and Eastern European countries that joined the
European Union in May 2004 and who are eligible to claim benefits are less likely than the native
population to do so. Similarly, natives appear to oppose different race immigration more as the
crime rate in the host country increases, implying that immigrants of a different race/ethnic
background contribute more to the crime rate. Although Butcher and Piehl (1998) find that
immigrants to the US have much lower rates of criminality than natives, they may indirectly
contribute to crime if immigration leads to increased group conflict, or if social tensions lead to
harassment or violence towards the immigrant population.
4.1. Immigration and Education
We turn now to examine the extent to which opposition towards immigration is correlated
with the respondent’s education, and estimate our model separately for each level of education
(Table 5). In this instance, we only present the pooled probit results since the average cohort size
becomes too small if we separate by education level.
<<Table 5 here>>
Here we find that for those with a post-secondary education the higher the proportion of non-
nationals in a given region the less likely they are to oppose the arrival of different race
immigrants. In addition, they only perceive labour market competition from same race
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immigrants, which may suggest that same race immigrants are more highly skilled than those of a
different race. We find further indirect support for this hypothesis by examining data on
education and country of birth from the EU LFS, which shows that immigrants born in an EU
country have on average a higher level of education than natives and non-EU born immigrants
(see Table 3a in the Appendix).17 Similarly, Dustmann and Preston (2007) using data for the UK
argue that economic competition from potential immigrants is perceived more strongly by higher
skilled natives.
4.2. Immigration and Country
Next, we look more closely at the extent to which opposition towards immigration is affected
by a country’s immigration history. Preliminary evidence outlined in Section 2 suggests that there
is substantial cross-country variation in attitudes towards immigration, which may be reflective
of the immigration histories of these countries. Here we split our countries into four groups based
on their immigration history and/or geographical position.
At one end of the immigration spectrum we have a group of countries that have a long history
of immigration either as a result of their colonial past and citizenship laws (UK, France, the
Netherlands and Belgium), and/or post-war guest-worker policies (Austria, Switzerland,
Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, France, Denmark and Sweden). At the other end of the
spectrum we have a sample of countries that only joined the EU in the middle of the sample
period (May 2004), prior to which they were former Eastern Bloc countries, and thus have a
much different immigration history. These countries, in particular, are currently providing an
outflow of workers to the older EU member countries.18 See Hansen (2003) for a detailed review
of the history of immigration to Europe.
We split our countries into the following four groups, and estimate the pooled probit
regressions separately for each group (Table 6): (i) countries with a long history of immigration -
Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Germany, France, UK and the Netherlands (Panel A); (ii) the new
receiving countries - Spain, Greece, Ireland and Portugal (Panel B); (iii) new entrants to the EU
from Eastern Europe - Czech Republic, Estonia, Slovenia, Slovakia and Poland (Panel C); and
17 The data does not allow us to separate immigrants according to their race/ethnic origin; we only know whether
immigrants were born in an EU or non-EU country. To find the closest match with the ESS we focus on data for
2007, the year of the last EU enlargement.
18 These countries have either a very small or a negative rate (Poland) of net migration (see, Eurostat, demo_gind).
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(iv) the Nordic countries - Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden (Panel D).19
<< Table 6 here >>
We find that labour market considerations do not seem to be an important factor in shaping
attitudes towards immigration in the new receiving countries (Panel B). Moreover for these
countries we find evidence of a positive association between opposition towards immigration,
and the proportion of non-nationals in the respondent’s region (for those with a mid-level
education), which contrasts markedly with our countries in Panels A and B where the association
is once again negative. We argue that such a finding for our Panel B countries is in line with their
status as new immigration countries. Countries that are new to immigration often have an uneasy
relationship with their immigrant population at the outset, and it takes time before immigrants
become accepted as part of a country’s usual demographic make-up. The UK, for example, in the
late 1960s often had an uneasy relationship with its immigrant population. During the 1960s the
number of immigrants from the Commonwealth countries more than doubled and led to Enoch
Powell’s now infamous anti-immigration speech, which received support from the general
public.20
We also conduct our welfare analysis for each of our four groups of countries.21 We find that
while natives from groups A and B perceive that different race immigrants make their country a
worse place to live through their impact on the country’s public budget, respondents from the
Nordic countries and Luxembourg (group D) have this fear towards same race immigrants, which
may be reflective of the fact that the dominant foreign group in these countries are same race
rather than different race immigrants.
4.3. Robustness Tests
We conduct a series of sensitivity tests on our main results. First, the summary statistics
presented in Table 2 suggest that there is substantial cross-country variation in attitudes towards
immigration. Greece appears to be anti-immigration, while at the other end of the spectrum
Sweden appears to be pro-immigration. We find that excluding these two countries from our
sample does not alter our results.
Second, in line with Facchini and Mayda (2009) and Mayda (2006), among others, all our
19 See, for example, Boeri, et al. (2002) and Hansen (2003) for a review of the history of immigration to Europe,
which helped to form the basis of these groupings.
20 On the 20th April 1968, a Conservative MP, Enoch Powell, spoke out against immigration from the
Commonwealth in a speech that has since been called the 'Rivers of Blood' speech.
21 These results are not reported for brevity, but are available upon request.
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models include the attitudinal variables Immigrants are bad for the economy/culture/country as
control variables. As already mentioned, although these variables are potentially endogenous the
correlation coefficients between them and our three dependent variables are relatively small.
Despite this, we re-estimate all our models without these variables, and report the key findings in
Table 7. Here panels 1 and 2 are equivalent to the main results outlined in Table 3, while panels 3
and 4 are equivalent to the result on welfare implications outlined in Table 4. These results
confirm our earlier findings. Namely that natives’ attitudes towards immigration are influenced
by labour market considerations but also by the proportion of non-nationals in the respondent’s
region (what we term contact with immigrants), but more so for different race immigrants.
Next, we experiment with a narrower definition of our dependent variables, and classify those
respondents who report that they want to ‘allow none’ as those who want to limit the arrival of all
immigrants, same race immigrants and different race immigrants, respectively. Now the
proportion of respondents who oppose immigration in 2002 becomes 10% (overall), 4.77% (same
race) and 9.66% (different race), which is lower than the proportions reported in Table 1 for the
same year. Not surprisingly, the negative association we previously observed between the
proportion of non-nationals in the respondent’s region (our measure of contact) and opposition
towards the arrival of different race immigrants becomes insignificant. However, when we
conduct our analysis for groups of countries according to their immigration history and
geographic position, our previous results still hold. We find evidence of a positive association
between increased contact with immigrants and opposition towards the arrival of immigrants in
the new host countries (Panel B) while we find evidence of a negative association on attitudes
towards immigration for those countries with a long history of immigration (Panel A).
Finally, it might be the case that those individuals who are in paid employment or who are
unemployed but actively searching for work are more concerned about the effects of labour
market competition and the impact this may have on their wages and employment prospects than
those who are out of the labour force (Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007). We run separate
regressions for the sub-sample of respondents in the labour force, and find that the coefficients on
our variable measuring labour market competition are significantly larger compared to those
reported in Table 3.
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5. Conclusions
This paper uses data from the European Social Survey and Eurostat to analyse the extent to
which economic and non-economic variables affect opposition towards immigration in Europe.
Simple cross-tabulations suggest a common finding across all countries in that respondents are
more likely to want to limit the arrival of different race immigrants compared to those of the
same race. However, differences emerge in the extent to which countries prefer immigrants of the
same race compared with those of a different race. To explore these associations further we
estimate a multivariate probit pooled over all observations and control for unobserved effects in a
pseudo panel. After controlling for socioeconomic characteristics and allowing for cohort-
specific effects, we find that the relative importance of economic and non-economic variables in
shaping attitudes towards immigration depends crucially on the race of the arriving immigrants.
We find that the degree of contact that natives have had with immigrants is important in
shaping attitudes towards further immigration, but only towards those of a different race. These
findings are often reflective of a country’s immigration history. In contrast, we find that fears
over labour market competition are more likely to fuel opposition towards same race immigrants.
Natives appear to regard same race immigrants as representing a greater ‘threat’ (whether
perceived or actual) to their labour market opportunities than those of a different race. In contrast,
immigrants of a different race are perceived to have a more negative impact on the country’s
culture. Finally, in line with Dustmann and Preston (2007), we find evidence that social welfare
considerations are also important in determining attitudes towards further immigration, but
mainly towards those of a different race.
In conclusion, immigration is clearly a very emotive issue and understanding how individuals
perceive arriving immigrants is undoubtedly important in shaping a country’s immigration
policy. None more so is this important than within the EU where the free movement of persons is
a general right. However, perhaps more than most, this paper highlights that governments need
understand the complex interplay of factors that can fuel attitudes towards immigration within
their own specific countries, and caution should be met at any attempt to adopt a one size fits all
policy to immigration within the EU as is currently being debated.
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Table 1a: Pooled Sample
Country ESS Round 1 ESS Round 2 ESS Round 3 Total
Austria 0 885 1,017 1,902
Belgium 971 1,050 1,265 3,286
Switzerland 1,135 1,247 1,122 3,504
Czech Republic 601 1,099 0 1,700
Germany 1,787 1,728 1,708 5,223
Denmark 1,053 1,095 1,131 3,279
Estonia 0 811 0 811
Spain 586 600 824 2,010
Finland 1,585 1,655 1,556 4,796
France 0 1,120 1,302 2,422
United Kingdom 1,455 0 1,515 2,970
Greece 980 998 0 1,978
Ireland 0 1,260 834 2,094
Luxembourg 323 493 0 816
Netherlands 1,683 1,380 1,414 4,477
Norway 1,566 1,532 1,487 4,585
Poland 0 925 949 1,874
Portugal 626 660 651 1,937
Sweden 1,544 1,518 1,439 4,501
Slovenia 695 568 696 1,959
Slovakia 0 522 725 1,247
Total 16,590 21,146 19,635 57,371
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Table 2a: Definition of Variables
Variable Definition
Limit the arrival of immigrants = 1 if respondents report that they want to ‘allow none’ or ‘allow a few’ to either of the above questions, 0
otherwise.
Limit the arrival of same race
immigrants
= 1 if respondents report that they want to ‘allow none’ or ‘allow a few’ people of the same race or ethnic
group as most [country] people to come and live here, 0 otherwise.
Limit the arrival of different race
immigrants
= 1 if respondents report that they want to ‘allow none’ or ‘allow a few’ people of a different race or ethnic
group from most [country] people, 0 otherwise.
Proportion of non-nationals by
occupation
Proportion of non-nationals in a given occupation by year at the 1-digit Standard Occupation Classification.
Source: European Union Labour Force Survey.
Proportion of non-nationals by
region
Proportion of non-nationals in a given region by year (at NUTS level 2). The Nomenclature of territorial
units for statistics, abbreviated as NUTS, subdivides European countries into regions at three different levels
(NUTS 1, 2 and 3, respectively), moving from larger to smaller territorial units. Source: European Union
Labour Force Survey.
Proportion of non-nationals by
education level
Proportion of non-nationals by education level and year. Source: European Union Labour Force Survey.
Income The annual household income is coded in 12 intervals in thousand of Euros: j (less than €1.8); r (€1.8 to
under €3.6); c (€3.6 to under €6); m (€6 to under €12); f (€12 to under €18); s (€18 to under €24); k (€24 to
under €30); p (€30 to under €36); d (€36 to under €60); h (€60 to under €90); u (€90 to under €120); n (€120
or more).
Income >=€12,000 and <€36,000 = 1 if annual household income >= €12,000 and <€36,000 (bands f, s, k, and p), 0 otherwise.
Income>=€36,000 = 1 if annual household income >=€36,000 (bands d, h, u and n), 0 otherwise.
Employment Status:
Work = 1 if in paid work, 0 otherwise.
Education = 1 if in education, 0 otherwise.
Retired = 1 if retired, 0 otherwise.
Unemployed = 1 if unemployed, looking for a job or unemployed, not looking for a job, 0 otherwise.
Other = 1 if permanently sick or disabled, in community or military service, doing housework, looking after
children, other, 0 otherwise.
Male = 1 if male, 0 otherwise.
Household size Number of people living regularly as a member of the household.
Upper secondary education = 1 if highest education level is upper secondary, 0 otherwise.
Post-secondary education = 1 if highest education level is post-secondary and above, 0 otherwise.
Foreign = 1 if born abroad or if one or both parents were born abroad, 0 otherwise.
City = 1 if the respondent lives in a big city, the suburbs or outskirts of a big city, a town or small city, 0
otherwise.
Non-Economic/Attitudinal:
Immigrants are bad for the
economy
= 1 if response to the question: ‘Would you say it is generally bad or good for [country]’s economy that
people come to live here from other countries?’ (0, bad for the economy; …; 10, good for the economy) is
<5, 0 otherwise.
Immigrants are bad for the
country’s culture
= 1 if response to the question: ‘Would you say that [country]’s cultural life is generally undermined or
enriched by people coming to live here from other countries? (0, cultural life undermined; …; 10, cultural
life enriched) is <5, 0 otherwise.
Immigrants are bad for the
country
= 1 if response to the question: ‘Immigrants make country worse or better place to live’ (0, worse place to
live; …; 10, better place to live) is <5, 0 otherwise.
Religious = 1 if response to the question: ‘How religious are you’, (0, not at all religious; …; 10, very religious) is >5,
0 otherwise.
Right wing = 1 if response to the question: ‘In politics people sometimes talk of ‘left’ and ‘right’ … where would you
place yourself on this scale, where 0 means the left and 10 means the right? (0, left; …; 10, right)’ is >5, 0
otherwise.
Unsafe = 1 if response is ‘unsafe’ or ‘very unsafe’ to the question: ‘How safe do you – or would you - feel walking
alone in this area after dark?’ (1, very safe; 2, safe; 3, unsafe; 4 very unsafe), 0 otherwise.
Objective measures:
Regional unemployment Regional unemployment rate at NUTS level 2 for each country. Source: Eurostat, series reg_lfu3rt
(www.eurostat.org)
SSGDP Expenditure on social protection as a percentage of GDP. Eurostat, series spr_exp_gdp (www.eurostat.org)
Crime rate Total crimes recorded by the police divided by population. Eurostat, series crim_gen and demo-pjan.
(www.eurostat.org)
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Nationals Born in an EU
country
Born in a non-EU
country
Up to secondary 0.23 0.22 0.21 0.28
Upper secondary 0.49 0.50 0.45 0.42
Post-upper secondary 0.28 0.28 0.34 0.30
Total 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Source: Eurostat – EU LFS
Note: The table presents averages across countries included in our sample. There are two exceptions to this: the data only
allow us to separate nationals from non-nationals in Ireland and Germany.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Year 2002 2004 2006
Number of observations 16,590 21,146 19,633





=1 if want to limit the arrival of immigrants, 0
otherwise 0.471 8,073 0.480 10,390 0.476 8,899
=1 if want to limit the arrival of same race
immigrants, 0 otherwise 0.315 5,520 0.317 6,760 0.314 5,664
=1 if want to limit the arrival of different race
immigrants, 0 otherwise 0.451 7,738 0.459 9,979 0.450 8,583
Economic:
Proportion of non-nationals by occupation 0.059 0.077 0.066 0.088 0.052 0.058
Proportion of non-nationals by education 0.102 0.079 0.109 0.088 0.104 0.066
Proportion of non-nationals by region 0.056 0.081 0.066 0.089 0.058 0.071
Income<€12,000 0.173 3,286 0.238 5,469 0.199 3,755
Income >=€12,000 and <€36,000 0.516 8,243 0.504 9,700 0.496 9,330
Income>=€36,000 0.310 5,061 0.259 5,977 0.305 6,550
Employment status:
= 1 if unemployed, 0 otherwise 0.045 603 0.060 1,044 0.046 774
= 1 if in paid work, 0 otherwise 0.576 9,705 0.573 12,056 0.595 11,598
= 1 if in education, 0 otherwise 0.040 791 0.038 877 0.035 811
= 1 if retired, 0 otherwise 0.198 3,363 0.221 4,874 0.208 4,233
= 1 if permanently sick or disabled, in community
or military service, doing housework, looking after
children, others, 0 otherwise. 0.142 2,128 0.109 2,295 0.115 2,219
Regional unemployment rate 0.063 0.039 0.081 0.047 0.071 0.040
Non-Economic/Attitudinal:
Immigrants are bad for the economy 0.351 5,565 0.383 8,019 0.344 6,255
Immigrants are bad for the county’s culture 0.232 3,723 0.255 5,594 0.276 4,729
Immigrants are bad for the country 0.367 5,803 0.351 7,500 0.356 6,302
Religious (= 1 if religious, 0 otherwise) 0.368 6,583 0.391 8,727 0.366 7,821
Right wing (= 1 if right wing political ideology, 0
otherwise) 0.303 5,773 0.304 7,419 0.312 6,805
Unsafe (= 1 if feel unsafe walking in local area after
dark, 0 otherwise) 0.248 3,252 0.226 4,438 0.219 3,760
Household Characteristics:
Male 0.517 8,630 0.511 10,603 0.517 9,891
Age (years) 47.24 16.62 46.99 16.59 47.56 16.79
Household size 2.731 1.318 2.851 1.365 2.814 1.363
Foreign (= 1 if born abroad or have at least one
parent who was born abroad, 0 otherwise) 0.110 1,825 0.106 2,386 0.118 2,217
=1 if lives in the city, 0 otherwise 0.669 10,258 0.636 13,013 0.654 12,129
Educational attainment:
= 1 if primary, 0 otherwise 0.319 5,354 0.333 6,841 0.347 6,336
= 1 if highest education level is upper secondary, 0
otherwise. 0.379 6,446 0.343 7,810 0.265 6,010
= 1 if highest education level is post-secondary and
above, 0 otherwise. 0.302 4,790 0.325 6,495 0.388 7,289
Country Characteristics:
Social security benefits as a percentage of GDP 0.253 0.029 0.249 0.049 0.257 0.040
Crime rate 0.075 0.028 0.066 0.030 0.070 0.028
Note: Weighted mean for ESS variables only.
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Table 2: Attitudinal Responses Disaggregated by Country
Limit the arrival of immigrants Limit the arrival of same race
immigrants
Limit the arrival of different race
immigrants
Correlation coefficient: Proportion
of non-nationals by region






Austria 0.526 0.591 0.307 0.345 0.515 0.586 -0.006 -0.009 -0.009
Belgium 0.464 0.460 0.453 0.305 0.294 0.247 0.427 0.446 0.432 0.031 0.035 0.038
Switzerland 0.364 0.373 0.407 0.191 0.155 0.157 0.347 0.369 0.400 0.037 -0.017 0.046
Czech Republic 0.549 0.625 0.441 0.477 0.516 0.584 -0.043 -0.064 -0.033
Denmark 0.433 0.495 0.487 0.249 0.274 0.268 0.414 0.475 0.472 -0.051 -0.057 -0.051
Germany 0.531 0.532 0.462 0.252 0.197 0.140 0.515 0.521 0.455 -0.057 -0.084 -0.053
Estonia 0.700 0.440 0.681 0.005 0.026 0.002
Spain 0.488 0.481 0.477 0.404 0.418 0.420 0.462 0.463 0.459 0.018 0.009 0.021
Finland 0.653 0.633 0.603 0.421 0.420 0.383 0.638 0.618 0.591 -0.032 -0.024 -0.029
France 0.496 0.501 0.340 0.362 0.470 0.478 -0.111 -0.079 -0.109
United Kingdom 0.496 0.520 0.323 0.388 0.477 0.503 -0.001 -0.003 -0.001
Greece 0.888 0.825 0.706 0.663 0.886 0.819 0.023 -0.027 0.022
Ireland 0.351 0.286 0.228 0.202 0.326 0.261 -0.059 0.004 -0.058
Luxembourg 0.580 0.539 0.433 0.278 0.564 0.529 -0.034 -0.116 -0.034
Netherlands 0.434 0.464 0.494 0.363 0.334 0.398 0.406 0.435 0.481 -0.029 -0.034 -0.030
Norway 0.459 0.448 0.422 0.286 0.230 0.219 0.431 0.422 0.408 -0.092 -0.093 -0.076
Poland 0.406 0.321 0.293 0.189 0.379 0.305 -0.028 -0.045 -0.020
Portugal 0.636 0.654 0.625 0.547 0.535 0.569 0.626 0.629 0.609 0.044 0.047 0.036
Sweden 0.171 0.166 0.147 0.100 0.109 0.097 0.163 0.159 0.136 -0.051 -0.046 -0.052
Slovenia 0.458 0.426 0.434 0.325 0.317 0.263 0.432 0.377 0.409 0.005 -0.016 0.0001
Slovakia 0.377 0.441 0.230 0.290 0.343 0.404 -0.073 -0.077 -0.069
Overall 0.471 0.480 0.476 0.315 0.317 0.314 0.451 0.459 0.450 -0.009 -0.036 -0.005
Table 3: Estimates of Opposition towards Further Immigration
Pooled Probit Pseudo Panel
Variable All Same Race Different Race All Same Race Different Race
Proportion of non-nationals by occupation 0.184*** 0.223*** 0.184***
(0.061) (0.064) (0.060)
Proportion of non-nationals by education -0.141 1.076*** -0.390
(0.267) (0.268) (0.268)
Proportion of non-nationals by region -0.203** -0.113 -0.180* -0.858*** -0.141 -0.719**
(0.103) (0.094) (0.098) (0.306) (0.306) (0.307)
Income >=€12,000 and <€36,000 -0.025** -0.019** -0.026** -0.098*** -0.100*** -0.112***
(0.011) (0.008) (0.011) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
Income>=€36,000 -0.075*** -0.055*** -0.069*** -0.292*** -0.204*** -0.302***
(0.014) (0.010) (0.014) (0.041) (0.041) (0.042)
Employment status (base case unemployed):
= 1 if in paid work, 0 otherwise -0.001 -0.024 0.008 0.147*** -0.007 0.126**
(0.023) (0.021) (0.023) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050)
= 1 if in education, 0 otherwise -0.113*** -0.106*** -0.103*** -0.190*** -0.210*** -0.132*
(0.034) (0.028) (0.036) (0.072) (0.073) (0.073)
= 1 if retired, 0 otherwise 0.016 -0.023 0.028 0.231*** 0.027 0.244***
(0.025) (0.023) (0.023) (0.055) (0.056) (0.056)
= 1 if permanently sick or disabled, in community or military service,
doing housework, looking after children, others, 0 otherwise.
-0.004 -0.019 0.005 0.241*** -0.050 0.205***
(0.029) (0.023) (0.029) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057)
Regional unemployment rate -0.070 0.110 -0.078 0.216 0.354 0.067
(0.133) (0.153) (0.156) (0.370) (0.371) (0.371)
Non-Economic/Attitudinal:
Immigrants are bad for the economy 0.202*** 0.157*** 0.204*** 0.132*** 0.082*** 0.162***
(0.011) (0.009) (0.011) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
Immigrants are bad for the county’s culture 0.172*** 0.122*** 0.162*** 0.142*** 0.047 0.123***
(0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029)
Immigrants are bad for the country 0.251*** 0.173*** 0.249*** 0.287*** 0.311*** 0.287***
(0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
Religious (= 1 if religious, 0 otherwise) -0.026*** -0.029*** -0.026*** 0.035 0.015 0.041
(0.009) (0.006) (0.008) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
Right wing (= 1 if right wing political ideology, 0 otherwise) 0.086*** 0.021*** 0.089*** 0.125*** 0.026 0.147***
(0.011) (0.008) (0.012) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
Unsafe (= 1 if feel unsafe walking in the local area after dark, 0 otherwise) 0.030*** 0.019** 0.028*** 0.023 0.002 -0.001
(0.011) (0.008) (0.009) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031)
Household Characteristics:
Male 0.007 -0.001 0.008 0.145*** 0.015 0.146***
(0.009) (0.006) (0.010) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
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Age cohorts :
agegr2 -0.039*** -0.033*** -0.030**
(0.014) (0.008) (0.014)
agegr3 -0.074*** -0.036*** -0.061***
(0.020) (0.013) (0.020)
agegr4 -0.086*** -0.024* -0.075***
(0.019) (0.013) (0.019)
agegr5 -0.096*** -0.027 -0.083***
(0.020) (0.017) (0.018)
agegr6 -0.111*** -0.058*** -0.103***
(0.020) (0.017) (0.018)
Household size 0.005 -0.000 0.005 0.023** 0.059*** 0.032***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Foreign (= 1 if born abroad or have at least one parent who was born
abroad, 0 otherwise)
-0.010 -0.019** -0.016* -0.014 -0.079** -0.049
(0.009) (0.008) (0.010) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033)
= 1 if lives in the city, 0 otherwise -0.036*** -0.031*** -0.035*** 0.117*** 0.137*** 0.122***
(0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Educational attainment (base case primary and below):
= 1 if highest education level is upper secondary, 0 otherwise -0.057*** -0.040*** -0.050***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
= 1 if highest education level is post-secondary and above, 0 otherwise -0.147*** -0.102*** -0.139***
(0.007) (0.009) (0.007)
Pseudo R-squared 0.21 0.17 0.21
Log likelihood -31161.22 -29675.22 -31181.12
Number of id 710 710 710
R-squared 0.47 0.37 0.47
Number of observations 57,371 57,371 57,371 2,035 2,035 2,035
Note: Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Country and time dummies are included in all specifications. All variables in the pseudo panel are the average of the respective variables for
each cohort. Cohorts are defined using 6 age groups, 9 occupations and 16 economic sectors. Since the variables used in defining the cohorts cannot be used in the fixed effects estimations we instead measure labour
market competition in the pseudo panel with the proportion of non-nationals by education. Design and population size weights are used in all specifications.
Table 4: Estimates of Opposition towards Further Immigration: The Effects of Social Security Spending and the Crime Rate
Pooled Probit Pseudo Panel
Same Race Different Race Same Race Different Race
Proportion of non-nationals
by occupation
0.217*** 0.225*** 0.218*** 0.172*** 0.187*** 0.174***
(0.065) (0.064) (0.065) (0.059) (0.060) (0.059)
Proportion of non-nationals
by education
1.038*** 1.043*** 1.016*** -0.466* -0.446* -0.484*
(0.268) (0.268) (0.268) (0.267) (0.268) (0.267)
Proportion of non-nationals
by region
-0.115 -0.113 -0.115 -0.180* -0.181* -0.180* -0.080 -0.126 -0.073 -0.632** -0.692** -0.626**
(0.092) (0.094) (0.092) (0.097) (0.099) (0.097) (0.306) (0.306) (0.306) (0.305) (0.306) (0.305)
Immigrants are bad for the
economy
0.155*** 0.157*** 0.155*** 0.203*** 0.204*** 0.202*** 0.080*** 0.082*** 0.082*** 0.157*** 0.161*** 0.158***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
Immigrants are bad for the
county’s culture
0.122*** 0.122*** 0.122*** 0.162*** 0.162*** 0.162*** 0.049* 0.049* 0.051* 0.124*** 0.126*** 0.126***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029)
Immigrants are bad for the
country
0.067 0.139*** 0.070 0.006 0.168*** 0.016 0.204** 0.221*** 0.234*** 0.037 0.130** 0.063
(0.053) (0.018) (0.056) (0.064) (0.022) (0.069) (0.085) (0.060) (0.087) (0.085) (0.059) (0.087)
Immigrants are bad for the
country*SSGDP
0.389* 0.353 0.938*** 0.803** 0.510 -0.228 1.169*** 0.539
(0.201) (0.259) (0.249) (0.339) (0.372) (0.630) (0.370) (0.628)
Immigrants are bad for the
country*Crime rate
0.446* 0.094 1.128*** 0.351 1.524* 2.182 2.650*** 1.864
(0.254) (0.335) (0.305) (0.435) (0.886) (1.504) (0.885) (1.500)
Pseudo R-squared 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.21 0.21 0.21
Log likelihood -29311.21 -29672.32 -29311.13 -30804.58 -31167.71 -30803.78
Number of id 710 710 710 710 710 710
R-squared 0.38 0.37 0.38 0.48 0.47 0.48
Number of observations 56,720 57,371 56,720 56,720 57,371 56,720 2,033 2,035 2,033 2,033 2,035 2,033
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. As in Table 3 we include controls for economic variables (income and employment status), non-economic variables
(whether religious, political ideology, and whether feel unsafe), household characteristics (male respondent, household size, born abroad, live in the city, educational attainment), and objective
measures (regional unemployment rate). Country and time dummies are included in all specifications. All variables in the pseudo panel are the average of the respective variables for each cohort.
Cohorts are defined using 6 age groups, 9 occupations and 16 economic sectors. Since the variables used in defining the cohorts cannot be used in the fixed effects estimations we instead
measure labour market competition in the pseudo panel with the proportion of non-nationals by education. Design and population size weights are used in all specifications.
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Table 5: Estimates of Opposition towards Further Immigration by Educational Attainment: Pooled Probit
Same Race Different Race
Variable Primary Education Upper Secondary Post Secondary Primary Education Upper Secondary Post Secondary
Proportion of non-nationals by occupation 0.188 0.252* 0.296** 0.042 0.431*** 0.200
(0.117) (0.152) (0.151) (0.089) (0.126) (0.210)
Proportion of non-nationals by region -0.187 0.010 -0.102 -0.110 -0.048 -0.279***
(0.172) (0.144) (0.083) (0.121) (0.179) (0.078)
Immigrants are bad for the economy 0.163*** 0.142*** 0.156*** 0.180*** 0.181*** 0.238***
(0.012) (0.011) (0.015) (0.013) (0.014) (0.018)
Immigrants are bad for the county’s culture 0.116*** 0.128*** 0.117*** 0.138*** 0.150*** 0.196***
(0.019) (0.015) (0.019) (0.018) (0.016) (0.028)
Immigrants are bad for the country 0.188*** 0.162*** 0.155*** 0.206*** 0.261*** 0.258***
(0.012) (0.009) (0.017) (0.010) (0.011) (0.013)
Pseudo R-squared 0.13 0.13 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.21
Log likelihood -11006.98 -10837.10 -7781.07 -10523.75 -11456.14 -9092.40
Number of observations 18,531 20,266 18,574 18,531 20,266 18,574
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. As in Table 3 we include controls for economic variables (income and employment status), non-economic variables (whether religious,
political ideology, and whether feel unsafe), household characteristics (male respondent, household size, born abroad, live in the city, and educational attainment), and objective measures (regional
unemployment rate). Country and time dummies are included in all specifications. Design and population size weights are used in all specifications.
Table 6: Estimates of Opposition towards Further Immigration by Groups of Countries: Pooled Probit
Panel A Same Race Different Race
Variable All All Primary Upper Sec. Post Secondary All All Primary Upper Sec. Post Secondary
Proportion of non-nationals by occupation 0.424*** 0.414*** 0.653*** 0.225 0.467** 0.367*** 0.358*** 0.176 0.550*** 0.398
(0.145) (0.147) (0.206) (0.206) (0.188) (0.115) (0.116) (0.150) (0.170) (0.244)
Proportion of non-nationals by region -0.160** -0.157** -0.260 -0.148 -0.060 -0.256** -0.254** -0.212 -0.219 -0.244***
(0.066) (0.065) (0.168) (0.154) (0.100) (0.112) (0.111) (0.144) (0.200) (0.085)
Immigrants are bad for the economy 0.143*** 0.143*** 0.143*** 0.131*** 0.148*** 0.196*** 0.196*** 0.168*** 0.165*** 0.235***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.013) (0.015) (0.018) (0.012) (0.012) (0.016) (0.018) (0.019)
Immigrants are bad for the country’s culture 0.125*** 0.125*** 0.120*** 0.139*** 0.117*** 0.159*** 0.160*** 0.129*** 0.146*** 0.202***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.023) (0.019) (0.025) (0.011) (0.011) (0.020) (0.023) (0.031)
Immigrants are bad for the country 0.179*** -0.107 0.189*** 0.176*** 0.165*** 0.260*** -0.056 0.209*** 0.276*** 0.260***
(0.009) (0.164) (0.015) (0.012) (0.022) (0.010) (0.188) (0.020) (0.012) (0.019)
Immigrants are bad for the country*SSGDP 1.022 1.149*
(0.630) (0.693)
Pseudo R-squared 0.16 0.16 0.11 0.12 0.17 0.20 0.20 0.14 0.17 0.21
Log likelihood -11336.68 -11334.10 -3617.96 -4191.96 -3485.33 -12009.08 -12006.82 -3418.71 -4468.54 -4065.87
Number of observations 21,882 21,882 5,950 7,721 8,211 21,882 21,882 5,950 7,721 8,211
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. As in Table 3 we include controls for economic variables (income and employment status), non-economic variables (whether religious,
political ideology, and whether feel unsafe), household characteristics (male respondent, household size, born abroad, live in the city, and educational attainment), and objective measures (regional
unemployment rate). Country and time dummies are included in all specifications. Design and population size weights are used in all specifications.
Panel B Same Race Different Race
Variable All All Primary Upper Sec. Post Secondary All All Primary Upper Sec. Post Secondary
Proportion of non-nationals by occupation -0.035 0.002 -0.192 0.509** -0.192 -0.053 -0.026 -0.189* 0.200 -0.147
(0.081) (0.084) (0.126) (0.257) (0.429) (0.082) (0.084) (0.103) (0.262) (0.432)
Proportion of non-nationals by region -0.002 0.021 -0.350 1.147*** -0.357 0.201 0.219 -0.106 1.240** -0.124
(0.359) (0.353) (0.382) (0.364) (0.516) (0.368) (0.370) (0.335) (0.568) (0.562)
Immigrants are bad for the economy 0.177*** 0.165*** 0.145*** 0.193*** 0.296*** 0.207*** 0.197*** 0.162*** 0.204*** 0.377***
(0.018) (0.022) (0.028) (0.042) (0.064) (0.019) (0.021) (0.025) (0.051) (0.062)
Immigrants are bad for the country’s culture 0.102*** 0.110*** 0.102*** 0.099** 0.120* 0.148*** 0.150*** 0.133*** 0.147*** 0.179***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.027) (0.039) (0.067) (0.025) (0.026) (0.027) (0.046) (0.042)
Immigrants are bad for the country 0.181*** 0.209* 0.186*** 0.167*** 0.126*** 0.213*** -0.001 0.197*** 0.229*** 0.190***
(0.020) (0.121) (0.024) (0.033) (0.040) (0.016) (0.103) (0.019) (0.037) (0.045)
Immigrants are bad for the country*SSGDP -0.123 1.065**
(0.537) (0.440)
Pseudo R-squared 0.16 0.16 0.12 0.17 0.19 0.21 0.21 0.17 0.24 0.24
Log likelihood -5744.18 -5361.32 -3322.80 -1215.80 -1073.67 -5399.52 -5039.10 -3028.49 -1152.73 -1078.27
Number of observations 9,921 9,270 5,485 2,190 2,246 9,921 9,270 5,485 2,190 2,246
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. As in Table 3 we include controls for economic variables (income and employment status), non-economic variables (whether religious,
political ideology, and whether feel unsafe), household characteristics (male respondent, household size, born abroad, live in the city, and educational attainment), and objective measures (regional
unemployment rate). Country and time dummies are included in all specifications. Design and population size weights are used in all specifications.
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Panel C Same Race Different Race
Variable All All Primary Upper Sec. Post Secondary All All Primary Upper Sec. Post Secondary
Proportion of non-nationals by occupation 0.334*** 0.338*** -0.127 0.281 0.638*** 0.048 0.026 -0.236 0.190 0.030
(0.115) (0.114) (0.420) (0.205) (0.184) (0.180) (0.194) (0.623) (0.227) (0.145)
Proportion of non-nationals by region -8.273*** -8.252*** -0.731 -8.259*** -9.586*** -3.820 -3.854* -16.330** -0.928 -9.479**
(2.300) (2.288) (16.380) (2.115) (2.910) (2.332) (2.326) (8.161) (3.368) (3.729)
Immigrants are bad for the economy 0.189*** 0.189*** 0.223*** 0.168*** 0.165*** 0.205*** 0.205*** 0.194*** 0.214*** 0.193***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.030) (0.029) (0.028) (0.020) (0.020) (0.038) (0.024) (0.037)
Immigrants are bad for a country’s culture 0.129*** 0.129*** 0.102* 0.121*** 0.225*** 0.162*** 0.162*** 0.189*** 0.145*** 0.140**
(0.039) (0.039) (0.053) (0.042) (0.076) (0.041) (0.040) (0.061) (0.040) (0.056)
Immigrants are bad for the country 0.120*** 0.022 0.179*** 0.070*** 0.094* 0.141*** 0.334** 0.129** 0.131*** 0.185***
(0.026) (0.106) (0.049) (0.026) (0.050) (0.033) (0.157) (0.051) (0.043) (0.059)
Immigrants are bad for the country*SSGDP 0.463 -0.962
(0.559) (0.905)
Pseudo R-squared 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.23 0.16 0.16 0.14 0.17 0.16
Log likelihood -3737.39 -3737.17 -1188.98 -1882.53 -549.17 -4247.74 -4247.07 -1319.17 -2065.38 -760.05
Number of observations 7,591 7,591 2,238 3,776 1,577 7,591 7,591 2,238 3,776 1,577
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. As in Table 3 we include controls for economic variables (income and employment status), non-economic variables (whether religious,
political ideology, and whether feel unsafe), household characteristics (male respondent, household size, born abroad, live in the city, and educational attainment), and objective measures (regional
unemployment rate). Country and time dummies are included in all specifications. Design and population size weights are used in all specifications.
Panel D Same Race Different Race




sample Primary Upper Sec. Post Secondary
Proportion of non-nationals by occupation 0.321** 0.306** 0.180 0.743** -0.011 0.185 0.179 0.096 0.973*** -0.608
(0.129) (0.129) (0.429) (0.322) (0.129) (0.244) (0.245) (0.584) (0.240) (0.429)
Proportion of non-nationals by region -0.511** -0.481** -0.493 -0.447 -0.488*** -0.756** -0.749** -0.722 -0.550* -1.051***
(0.212) (0.200) (0.571) (0.273) (0.119) (0.348) (0.346) (0.766) (0.322) (0.324)
Immigrants are bad for the economy 0.143*** 0.141*** 0.174*** 0.146*** 0.112*** 0.214*** 0.213*** 0.218*** 0.212*** 0.204***
(0.006) (0.008) (0.011) (0.009) (0.012) (0.008) (0.007) (0.016) (0.012) (0.014)
Immigrants are bad for the country’s culture 0.080*** 0.075*** 0.113*** 0.084*** 0.047 0.182*** 0.180*** 0.150*** 0.192*** 0.204***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.011) (0.016) (0.029) (0.011) (0.011) (0.024) (0.011) (0.021)
Immigrants are bad for the country 0.140*** -0.161* 0.167*** 0.140*** 0.121*** 0.303*** 0.151 0.269*** 0.302*** 0.340***
(0.013) (0.086) (0.042) (0.015) (0.011) (0.025) (0.125) (0.026) (0.030) (0.032)
Immigrants are bad for the country*SSGDP 1.182** 0.523
(0.506) (0.358)
Pseudo R-squared 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.16 0.18 0.30 0.30 0.31 0.28 0.30
Log likelihood -7538.36 -7524.17 -2326.73 -3096.27 -2080.98 -8344.38 -8343.16 -2307.55 -3250.00 -2721.00
Number of observations 17,977 17,977 4,858 6,579 6,540 17,977 17,977 4,858 6,579 6,540
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. As in Table 3 we include controls for economic variables (income and employment status), non-economic variables (whether religious,
political ideology, and whether feel unsafe), household characteristics (male respondent, household size, born abroad, live in the city, and educational attainment), and objective measures (regional
unemployment rate). Country and time dummies are included in all specifications. Design and population size weights are used in all specifications.
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Table 7: Estimates of Opposition towards Further Immigration: Robustness
Pooled Probit Pseudo panel Pooled probit: Social Welfare
Implications
Pseudo panel: Social Welfare
Implications
Variable All Same Race Different Race All Same Race Different Race Same Race Different Race Same Race Different Race
Proportion of non- nationals by 0.401*** 0.383*** 0.402*** 0.279*** 0.266***
Occupation (0.058) (0.064) (0.055) (0.071) (0.056)
Proportion of non- nationals by -0.301*** -0.204* -0.280** -1.118*** -0.384 -0.982*** -0.143 -0.210** -0.057 -0.609*
Region (0.117) (0.106) (0.115) (0.343) (0.333) (0.345) (0.098) (0.104) (0.309) (0.314)
Proportion of non-nationals by -0.178 0.958*** -0.475 0.996*** -0.441
Education (0.295) (0.287) (0.297) (0.266) (0.270)
Immigrants are bad for the 1.080*** 1.413*** 1.448*** 1.754***
country *SSGDP (0.082) (0.116) (0.420) (0.427)
Immigrants are bad for the -0.050 0.309 0.567 0.275
country *Crime rate (0.323) (0.398) (1.466) (1.489)
Pseudo R-squared 0.0941 0.0790 0.0917 0.142 0.178
Log likelihood -35946 -32925 -35893 -30279 -32090
Number of observations 710 710 710 710 710
R-squared 0.326 0.253 0.322 0.364 0.445
Number of observations 57,371 57,371 57,371 2,035 2,035 2,035 56,720 56,720 2,033 2,033
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. As in Table 3 we include controls for economic variables (income and employment status), non-economic variables (whether religious,
political ideology, and whether feel unsafe), household characteristics (male respondent, household size, born abroad, live in the city, and educational attainment), and objective measures (regional unemployment
rate), but unlike the other Tables here we exclude: Immigrants are bad for the economy/culture/country. Country and time dummies are included in all specifications. All variables in the pseudo panel are the average
of the respective variables for each cohort. Cohorts are defined using 6 age groups, 9 occupations and 16 economic sectors. Since the variables used in defining the cohorts cannot be used in the fixed effects
estimations we instead measure labour market competition in the pseudo panel with the proportion of non-nationals by education. Design and population size weights are used in all specifications.
